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Abstract
The effects of political characteristics on the Congressional appropriations process have
remained a subject of debate in recent years. Congressionally directed spending influenced by
these effects are defined as earmarks. To counter the practice of earmarking, Congress
implemented multiple reforms and rules to curb the influence of partisan agendas. Total federal
appropriations by year and state from 2002 – 2018 were aggregated to test the significance of the
economic and political effects. This model utilized a time series fixed effects regression to
determine the results that suggest select political characteristics of U.S. Senators remained
significant in the distribution of federal appropriations following the implementation of the
Congressional earmark reforms and moratorium.
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Executive Summary
Each fiscal year the U.S. Congress considers multiple appropriations packages that
culminate in the annual federal budget. This process is influenced by several factors, including
the political characteristics of Congressional Representatives and Senators. Congressionally
directly spending that would benefit a specific entity, locality, congressional district, or state
other than through a statutory or administrative formula or competitive award process are
defined as earmarks. In recent years, Congress has attempted to curb the practice of earmarks
through multiple reforms and a moratorium.
No comprehensive research has been conducted to evaluate the effects of political
characteristics on the appropriation of total federal funding following the implementation of the
earmark reforms. This study will focus on determining the significant effects of the economic
factors and political characteristics on the allocation of federal appropriations. A time series
fixed effects regression model of panel data will be used to analyze and determine these effects.
The results of this analysis indicate although Congress implemented multiple reforms to
reduce and eliminate earmarks, select political characteristics remained significant in the
allocation of federal funds to the states. The political effect of greatest significance determined
that a bi-partisan state delegation in the U.S. Senate attracted the maximum amount of federal
funding comparatively with other characteristics. The findings also determined economic factors
significantly influence the allocation process utilizing population, labor force, and median
income statistics. The implications of these findings demonstrate that political intrigue and
economic data remain influential in the appropriations process. This result can foster the debate
to analyze the effectiveness of the earmark moratorium and concurrent reforms.
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Introduction
The annual Congressional appropriations process attracts intrigue, attention, and
influence across the nation. What could be an uneventful procedural tradition is transformed and
intensified by constituent activities, interest groups, and the media sphere. The federal funding
allocation process affects all facets of American life and the economy from direct individual
benefits, agency contracts, grant programs, loan guarantees, state funding initiatives, and local
government investments. Therefore, close attention to the factors that affect federal
appropriations are paramount in the receipt of these funds and their justification. This study will
focus on the impacts of federal appropriations at the state level by fiscal year. There are
numerous factors that can influence the appropriation of federal funds from media, lobbying, the
economy, and entities or individuals of status. However, this study will focus on the effects of
the political characteristics of members serving in Congress, specifically U.S. Senators. To
sufficiently measure these characteristics, the effects of political power and status on the
distribution of federal appropriations can be expressed through the practice of earmarking. The
Congressional Research Service defines the term earmark as,
“any congressionally directed spending, tax benefit, or tariff benefit be considered an
earmark if it would benefit a specific entity or state, locality, or congressional district other than
through a statutory or administrative formula or competitive award process.”1
Earmarked appropriations can be utilized for specific projects, municipalities, and institutions
within a state or Congressional district. However, this type of federal funding practice has earned
the colloquial term “pork barrel” spending. Although earmarking has been a practice in federal
appropriations for centuries, the U.S. Congress has adopted reforms and a moratorium in recent
years. These policies originated under a U.S. House Republican majority via party rules and

1

Lifting the Earmark Moratorium: Frequently Asked Questions, prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, D.C., 2018.
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committee protocols and remains enforced by party and committee leadership in both chambers.
To date, the U.S. Senate has mirrored these policies and following the 2018 midterm elections,
Democrats in the House have continued the practice. Congress initially banned the practice of
earmarks in an effort to curb an ever-increasing trajectory of overspending and hinder the
development of politically driven appropriations.2 Prior to the earmark moratorium,
Representatives, Senators, local organizations, governments, and lobbyists worked in
conjunction to secure federal funds through the legislative process. The federal agency
application method has been an existing established procedure for federal funding solicitations
however, requests to Congressional members were an alternative with more direct and simplified
methods available.3
With earmark reforms and a moratorium recently adopted, there remains debate on
Capitol Hill over the decision to lift the existing restrictions on this funding strategy. Questions
regarding the validity and effectiveness of these reforms have lawmakers divided and unsure
how to proceed with a comprehensive strategy. This deliberation amongst Congressional
members transcends political party lines and continues to persist on arguments of the direct or
indirect influences of Congressional funding methods and political interests.4
This study will analyze the effects of earmarks and formula driven appropriations on
Congressionally directed spending and determine whether political characteristics have remained
influential in the appropriations process. Economic factors will be analyzed to control for the
broader effects of the national economy while also accounting for each states’ ability to attract
funding on a per capita basis. This analysis will observe whether these factors have each

Lifting the Earmark Moratorium: Frequently Asked Questions, prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, D.C., 2018.
Thomas E. Elwood. “Congressional Earmarks and Pork Barrel Politics.” Journal of Allied Health Volume 31, Issue No. 3 (2002): 127 – 130.
https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.uky.edu/docview/210974971/fulltextPDF/33D4B726225B44BEPQ/1?accountid=11836
4
John Hudak, “Congress in 2019: Why the First Branch Sound Bring Back Earmarks,” Brookings December 27, 2018,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/12/27/congress-in-2019-why-the-first-branch-should-bring-back-earmarks/
2
3
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correlated with total federal spending to determine if a significant pattern has developed in the
allocation of federal appropriations to the states by year.
With developing reforms and the establishment of the earmark moratorium, Congress
aimed to restrain federal overspending and increase accountability measures in the legislative
funding process. However, the debates to revive the practice of earmarks have persisted.
Earmarking appropriations serves as an expression of politically motivated spending.
Considering the ongoing discussions and deliberations over earmarks, this analysis will observe
how political characteristics and economic factors have each individually correlated with the
appropriations process. By evaluating whether the allocation of federal funding awards by state
and year have changed, this study will determine if significant effects have occurred.
Problem Statement, Deals and Reforms
The deal making process occurring in the legislature has been clashing with the
Executive branch agency funding allocation process since the beginning of the nineteenth
century. Presidents Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe believed that the
Constitution should be amended to allow for the federal government to solely control the
allocation and finance of internal improvement projects at the national level. However,
Representative Henry Clay and Senator John Calhoun believed that this power rested primarily
with the U.S. Congress through the power of the commerce clause. This debate between the early
officials of American government over the jurisdiction of appropriations led to the evolving
debate regarding politically driven earmarked spending. In recent decades, coalitions within
Congress and citizen groups have formed opposing the practice of earmarked spending.5 The
rising opposition in the public, Presidential administrations, and with individual members of

Thomas E. Elwood. “Congressional Earmarks and Pork Barrel Politics.” Journal of Allied Health Volume 31, Issue No. 3 (2002): 127 – 130.
https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.uky.edu/docview/210974971/fulltextPDF/33D4B726225B44BEPQ/1?accountid=11836
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Congress led to the gradual evolution of policy reforms that culminated in the earmark
moratorium.
Although this debate has primarily taken place on Capitol Hill, the effects of earmarking
reforms and its ban extend to every state, county, city, and town in the U.S. The administration
of federal funding awards reflects upon Congressional members, Senators, executive federal
agencies, state governments, and local municipalities. In addition, the economic factors of each
region and state have potential independent effects on the federal funding process. Therefore, the
earmark reforms and moratorium have instituted wide ranging changes to how applicants and
recipients of federal funding communicate with elected federal representatives regarding their
funding requests.6 Although the effects of the reforms and moratorium are still unfolding
throughout the U.S., detailed analysis of the political characteristics associated with members of
Congress will reveal how this policy has made impacts on the politically motivated distribution
of appropriations.
Regarding the efficiency of the moratorium policies and its effects on federal funding
awards, the implications are yet to be completely determined due to the recent implementation
actions. Although there has been extensive analysis on earmarking prior to the reforms, research
on the potential effects of Congressional political characteristics require additional analysis. With
supplementary research of this topic, Congress will have the opportunity to assess whether the
reforms have made significant effects on political influence. This analysis will aim to observe the
period prior and leading to the earmark reforms and years following the implementation of the
moratorium to determine the effect of political characteristics on federal appropriations over the
period evaluated. This analysis will further demonstrate if an adjustment in Congressionally

6

Gordon Steven, “Essays on the Political Economy of Intergovernmental Grants” (PhD Dissertation, University of Kentucky, Lexington, 2017).
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directed spending has culminated in the distribution of federal funding awards to the states.
Following the conclusions of this analysis, the effects of earmarked appropriations and economic
factors can be further assessed to educate and inform lawmakers of earmarks and their impacts in
Washington and throughout the nation.
Review of Literature
Prior to the implementation of the earmark reforms and moratorium, Congressional
political status was exploited to influence the federal funding and legislative process. The federal
agency application method was an established procedure for federal funding solicitations,
however direct requests to Congressional members by constituent groups served as the more
direct and alternative method. In recent decades, coalitions within Congress and citizen groups
have formed opposing the practice of earmarks.7 Although federal agency applications are
complex and numerous, the utilization of federal grants to states and local governments has
increased. The Congressional Research Service states,
“outlays for federal grants to state and local governments, in both nominal and constant dollars,
and the number of federal grants to state and local governments have continued to increase since
the mid-1980s.”8
As the formula driven process has continued to increase in size and scope, earmarked spending
has undergone a series of major reforms starting with the administration of President George W.
Bush.
With the debate over Congressionally legislated earmarks accelerating into the mid2000s, President Bush’s Administration initiated an Executive stance on the continuation of the
practice. Prior to the 110th Congress, the Bush Administration included language in the
Thomas E. Elwood. “Congressional Earmarks and Pork Barrel Politics.” Journal of Allied Health Volume 31, Issue No. 3 (2002): 127 – 130.
https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.uky.edu/docview/210974971/fulltextPDF/33D4B726225B44BEPQ/1?accountid=11836
8
Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues, prepared by the Congressional Research
Service. Washington, D.C., 2019.
7
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Executive budget proposals critiquing the use of earmarks. By the beginning of the 110th
Congress, both the U.S. House and Senate established official definitions for earmarks. In
addition to the Congressional definitions, the President’s Office of Management and Budget
created its own definition of an earmark and issued instructions to the Executive agencies to
track earmarked funding during the fiscal year 2008 appropriations process to measure whether
Congress met the President’s budget goals.
For fiscal year 2009, the President made his stance against earmarks clear in his State of
the Union Address. President Bush stated he would veto the fiscal year 2009 appropriations bill
if Congress did not cut earmarked funding in half relative to fiscal year 2008. The President
would do so by signing Executive Order 13457. The order stated three explicit purposes of
reducing the number of earmarks originating in Congress, making their origin and purpose
transparent, and including Congressionally originated earmarks in the text of bills instead of
other documents. The order prompted a discussion on how the Executive and Congress would
proceed forward regarding the debate on earmarks. This friction led to the growth of working
relationships between the two branches. However, concerns arose around the practice of the
Executive utilizing federal agencies to pressure Congress’ ability to carry out representational
activities that are an implicit component of its constitutional responsibilities.9
In addition to the reforms and actions prompted by the Bush Administration, the U.S.
Congress implemented its own restrictions and reforms starting in 2006. By fiscal year 2006,
Congress and the Executive took note of the continued utilization of earmarking, but so did many
constituent advocacy groups rallying against the practice. In addition to the fiscal year 2007

Bush Administration Policy Regarding Congressionally Originated Earmarks: An Overview. Prepared by the Congressional Research Service,
Washington, D.C., 2008.
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Bush Administration efforts to regulate earmarking, the Congressional appropriations committee
chairs implemented a one-time moratorium on earmarks for fiscal year 2007. Multiple individual
House Members and Senators were pushing the ban on earmarks, including Senator John
McCain, as a reformed policy platform. Adding to the increasing pressure regarding earmarks,
both chambers of Congress began to adopt multiple disclosure and reporting rules in an attempt
to publicize which Members and Senators were utilizing earmarked funding. As reforms were
building in Congress and the Executive continued to apply pressure on Capitol Hill, the new U.S.
House Republican majority entertained the initiative to completely ban earmarks. With rising
criticisms from the Executive Branch and constituent groups in the early 2000s, building
pressure and voices from within the U.S. Congress began to make headway on regulating
earmarked funding practices.10
The literature thus far has demonstrated that the evolution of the Congressional earmark
moratorium of 2011 was not a sudden, quick decision. However, the establishment of the
moratorium arose from a gradual implementation of various rules, Executive Orders, and
pressure campaigns. These increasing restrictions against earmarking over multiple years from
various sectors, political players, and administrative approaches demonstrate that multiple
stakeholders were necessary to establish the reforms and moratorium over time.
Following the implementation of the earmark moratorium, a researcher at the University
of Kentucky found that the earmark ban had impacted the distribution of federal competitive
grants and projects, primarily at the state and local government levels. The earmark moratorium
demonstrated that it was not solely responsible for the relative decline in federal grants between
districts with earmarks versus those without due to trends and building reforms occurring prior to

Richard Doyle and Nancy Roberts. “Real Reform or Change for Chumps: Earmark Policy Developments, 2006 – 2010.” Public Administration
Review Volume 71, Issue No. 1 (2011): 34 – 44. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.uky.edu/stable/41061153?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

10
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the ban. On the state government level, the moratorium reversed the trend of increasing grant
levels in more heavily earmarked states relative to states with a less number of earmarks. State
level data captured longitudinal variation of federal grant allocation. Local government analysis
captured cross-sectional variation in earmarking across Congressional districts driven by U.S.
House Members. Therefore, the analysis of the reforms leading up to the earmark moratorium in
2011 are critical to the understanding of the moratorium overall.11
The results of this economic study on the effects of the earmark ban had differential
impact on the distribution of federal competitive grants. On the local government level, the
moratorium was not responsible for the relative decline in federal grants between Congressional
districts that received a greater number of earmarks versus those that did not. This trend was
already gradually occurring with reforms, primarily in the U.S. House, prior to the
implementation of the earmark moratorium in 2011.12 On the state level of analysis, the earmark
ban reversed the trend of increasing grant levels in more heavily earmarked states relative to
states that received less earmarked funding. Therefore, this dissertation found that the practice of
direct earmarking decreased the level of equality in the distribution of federal grant funding.
Combined, the earmark reforms leading up to the moratorium and the rules implemented by both
chambers of Congress demonstrated an improvement in federal grant funding allocation
concerning equality.13
When evaluating the conclusions of this research, the researcher states the remaining
point of debate should not determine which projects are within the qualifications and
requirements of federal grant funding applications. However, the focus of study should be on

Gordon Steven, “Essays on the Political Economy of Intergovernmental Grants” (PhD Dissertation, University of Kentucky, Lexington, 2017).
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
11
12

CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS AND EARMARKS

13

who is better incentivized and informed to determine allocation of federal grant funding, the
Executive agency experts or legislators in the U.S. Congress.14 With the continued
implementation of the moratorium rules, this study concludes that federal grants are more
proportionately distributed at the state level. Regarding the remaining question of which players
in the federal funding process are better incentivized and informed, members of Congress are left
with the ability to commandeer this advantage by utilizing political prowess to circumvent or
overturn moratorium rules. This specific point can be further evaluated by focusing this research
on not only federal grant funding, but evaluating federal discretionary spending through grants,
direct payments, contracts, and loans. Concentrated analysis of the effects of federal funding
could demonstrate the relevance of political variables or if legislators have found a way to
remain politically influential in the funding allocation process.
Continued relevancy of political factors is further exacerbated by the increasing
polarization in Washington. The practice of earmarking secures appropriations for the express
purpose of funneling federal funding awards into a legislator’s local district or state. Thus,
earmarks can potentially compress the distribution of members’ and Senators’ ideologies relative
to the ideologies of their district or state populations.15 With the need to secure funding,
Congressional representatives are willing to compromise on their strong ideological stances to
foster bipartisanship between differing political spectrums.16 However, with the implementation
of the moratorium, concerns have developed on Capitol Hill that this political currency has lost
much of its strength and polarization has potentially worsened due to the new earmark reforms.
Determining the effects of political factors on funding allocation will provide the data necessary

Ibid.
Aaron Hedlund. “Pork-Barrel Politics and Polarization.” Review – Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Volume 101, Issue No. 1, (2019): 57 – 68.
https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.uky.edu/docview/2171586287/fulltextPDF/571283D2BDEB4E47PQ/1?accountid=11836
16
Ibid.
14
15

CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS AND EARMARKS

14

to assess this increasing trend. The analysis thus far of this issue remains unclear due to the time
interval since the availability of federal funding data and the implementation of the earmark
reforms. However, with federal funding data accessible back to 2002 and the first earmark
reforms initiated in 2007, sufficient time has passed to conduct a preliminary analysis of the
relationship between federal appropriations, Congressional political characteristics, and state
economic factors.
Research Question and Hypotheses
With the increasing role of political polarization evolving in Washington, the earmark
moratorium developed out of the concerns over augmented federal spending and “pork-barrel”
project developments in Congressional representatives’ districts and states. With growing
concern regarding these issues arising in Congress, the Bush Administration, and constituent
groups, gradual reforms progressed in the U.S. House of Representatives. Following years of
steady reform actions, both chambers of Congress adopted the earmark moratorium rules by the
beginning of the 113th Congress. Although the moratorium rules have lent to the proportionate
allocation of federal grant funding at the state level, there are concerns that earmark reforms have
exacerbated political polarization in Washington. Increasing attention to the widening political
gap will further support the need for an assessment of political factors in the appropriation of tax
funded initiatives. A model will be constructed to analyze the existence of a relationship between
federal appropriations, state economic factors, and political characteristics in Congress to address
these concerns.
To determine if the earmark reforms and moratorium had a significant effect in
Congressionally directed spending, this research will observe the effects of these policies at the
federal level due to the moratorium’s adoption in the U.S. Congress. The establishment of this
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protocol will be evaluated utilizing an ordinary least squares regression model. Congressionally
directed spending items will be observed by aggregating federally administered grants, direct
payments, loans, and contracts awarded to each state in the annual appropriations process. State
specific federal spending by year will be observed to categorize the data. This study will analyze
whether correlations exist between federal appropriations, state specific economic factors, and
the aggregated political characteristics concurrent with each state’s Senatorial delegation serving
in the U.S. Congress. Therefore, the null hypothesis will be determined as follows,
H0: The earmark reforms and moratorium did not have a significant effect in the distribution of
federal funding awards at the state level independent of the U.S. Senator serving in Congress.
The rejection of the null, or alternative hypothesis is outlined below,
HA: The earmark reforms and moratorium had a significant effect in the distribution of federal
funding awards at the state level independent of the U.S. Senator serving in Congress.
If results reject the null hypothesis, this model will produce a significant effect that demonstrates
that the allocation of federal funding awards are independent of Senatorial political influence in
the distribution of federal awards over the period analyzed. If this model fails to reject the null
hypothesis, it will demonstrate that the earmark moratorium failed to curb political influence in
the allocation of federal awards. If results fail to reject the null hypothesis, further analysis of the
control variables could warrant reevaluation of the moratorium and concurrent reforms to
address the use of earmarks. Thus, the research question will determine the statistically
significant effect of political status on the federal appropriations process. This result will further
demonstrate the continued effectiveness and implementation of the earmark reforms and
moratorium.
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Analysis of Data
The dependent variable of this study will be Congressionally directed spending items.
These funds are allocated through the annual appropriations process approved by the U.S. House
and Senate. This is a required Constitutional responsibility each fiscal year, however the
procedure is subject to alterations, extensions, and continuing resolutions. The earmark
moratorium and reforms were adopted to create greater transparency in the distribution of federal
funding and streamline an organized, formula based, and competitive system to allocate awards.
This policy would aim to lessen the effect of political power by funneling awards through the
federal bureaucracies, states, and federally commissioned organizations. The unit of analysis for
this study will be federal appropriation data by state and fiscal year. Therefore, an individual
state within a specific fiscal year will serve as one unit of analysis. Although it would be
comprehensive to evaluate both effects in the U.S. House and Senate, state data remains constant
over time and is not subject to changes in state boundaries due to population shifts or state
legislative directives. Congressional district data is altered each time the Constitutionally
mandated census is implemented every ten years.17 In addition, Congressional district data
provided by the U.S. Department of Treasury contains omitted variables and incomplete
information. However, each federal award is detailed by recipient state.18 Therefore, this study
will focus on economic, political, and federal funding data by state and year. With the focus of
this model on Senators and states, the Senate definition of an earmark will determine what data is

U.S. Const. art. I, § 2
Award Data Archive, prepared by the U.S. Department of Treasury (Washington, D.C., 2019).
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A www.usaspending.gov_-23_download-5Fcenter_award5Fdata5Farchive&d=DwMFg&c=L93KkjKsAC98uTvC4KvQDdTDRzAeWDDRmG6S3YXllH0&r=zG4OKSHOL9AqZiSFq_FCJU1cQ7MXqy
qxzXysXVq4dmY&m=7h22aA8CoBiI0uNBqppBcGqeG50BQZxmoWdLcQQg0rs&s=TmOY6VDAyu4d7o4PpuvbHZsQDZ0mSNoCwEvPfyte
oT8&e
17
18
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observed and provide further detail to Congressionally directed spending items. The Senate
defines a Congressionally directed earmark as,
“a provision or report language included primarily at the request of a Senator providing,
authorizing or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit
authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority,
or other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality or congressional
district, other than through a statutory or administrative formula driven or competitive award
process.”19
Congressionally directed spending items analyzed in this study include grants, contracts, direct
payments, loans, and indefinite delivery vehicles. These directed items encompass a wide range
of awards allocated by the annual appropriations process to state and local recipients. In addition,
they are clearly reported, valued, and measurable utilizing direct funding data provided by the
U.S. Department of Treasury. Furthermore, these types of awards were subject to earmarking
prior to the moratorium and reforms. The data will range from fiscal years 2002 to 2018 and
encompass all 50 states, resulting in 850 total observations. Limited tax and tariff benefits are
also detailed by the Senate definition of an earmark. However, with the limited ability to
measure these provisions following the earmark moratorium, this report will focus on
Congressionally directed spending items. Below is a summary table of the federal appropriations
that were allocated between fiscal years 2002 to 2018 by year.
VARIABLES20

Descriptive Statistics: Federal Appropriations

Years: 2002 - 2018

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

$8.7 billion
$9.88 billion
$9.68 billion
$11.3 billion
$13.3 billion
$31.1 billion
$41.5 billion
$48.7 billion
$45.5 billion

$10.4
$13.4
$12.9
$14.5
$16.8
$33.2
$47.1
$51.3
$50.7

$717 million
$774 million
$653 million
$691 million
$706 million
$2.1 billion
$2.78 billion
$3.56 billion
$2.63 billion

$60.1 billion
$75.5 billion
$67.5 billion
$74.1 billion
$84.9 billion
$171 billion
$220 billion
$274 billion
$248 billion

billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion

Lifting the Earmark Moratorium: Frequently Asked Questions, prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, D.C., 2018.
Figure 1

19
20
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2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

$39.1
$52.3
$50.0
$55.6
$55.3
$62.5
$61.9
$66.5

billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion

$41.6
$53.7
$49.5
$58.8
$54.4
$66.3
$61.4
$71.3

billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion

18
$2.83
$3.11
$2.95
$3.26
$3.38
$3.75
$3.74
$3.19

billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion

$222
$238
$239
$269
$271
$306
$310
$329

billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion
billion

When observing the minimum and maximum amounts of federal allocations by year, the range in
spending data is widespread. However, the individual means demonstrate that concentrations of
funding are well below the maximum funding allocation each year. The large maximums
reported are due to larger outlier states like California and Texas that receive greater amounts of
funding on average. These results show that the appropriations data collected encompasses a
large dispersion. Below is a graph of federal appropriations by year during the period of analysis
for all 50 states.

21

21

Figure 2
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Several explanatory variables have the potential to affect the allocation of federal funding
awards. These variables range from agency policies, regional economic trends, state statutes,
political influence, and local activities. However, the explanatory variables selected for this study
focus on broader, national implications that are constant across regions, states, and localities.
Detailed analysis of the explanatory variables will establish a justification for the economic and
political factors included in this study. Population density heavily influences what type of federal
funding is awarded to population groups across the country.2223 Cities, urban centers, and densely
populated areas can sustain sufficient funding through a broad and diverse tax base. Less densely
populated areas rely upon outside or federal financial assistance to support basic government
services. Conversely, more heavily populated areas have the economic advantage to attract
private investment and federal sector funding. Municipalities and states also attract a need of
resources and request federal assistance. Labor force participation demonstrates the percentage
of the population currently engaged in the labor market.24 States and localities with smaller
percentages of labor force participation struggle to support services, encourage workforce
development, and create employment opportunities. With less of the population involved in the
work force, less business activity is occurring to attract capital, investment, and support a
sufficient tax base for states. Median income can play a major role in the federal funding
allocation process, especially through bureaucratic award formulas. The median income of a
state, region, or locality can serve as a significant economic indicator and measurement tool on

U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April, 2010 to July
1, 2019,” State Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010 – 2019, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010sstate-total.html
23
U.S. Census Bureau, “Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to
July 1, 2010,” State Intercensal Tables: 2000 – 2010, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/intercensal-2000-2010state.html
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U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Force Data by County,” Tables and Maps Created by BLS,
https://www.bls.gov/lau/
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earning and purchasing power.25 When observing average cost of living and the median income
of a specific population, this can serve as a gauge on economic health. Below is a summary table
of the economic factors included in this analysis.
VARIABLES26

Descriptive Statistics: Economic Factors

Years: 2002 – 2018

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Population

400

6,106,048

6,751,860

500,017

39,200,000

Labor Force Participation
Median Income

400
400

$3,060,267.00
$50,188.71

$3,273,781.00
$9,258.54

$256,414.00
$29,359.00

$19,000,000.00
$76,260.00

Similar to the appropriations data, the minimums and maximums of these variables demonstrate
a large dispersion in population and labor force participation varation. The relative economic
health of a state or locality will have a large impact on the influential factors a populace wields in
attracting federal funding. Each of these economic variables can individually effect the allocation
of federal funding awards independent of a representative serving in the U.S. Congress.
All federal funding begins with the annual appropriations process conducted by Congress
each fiscal year. Article I, Section IX, Clause VII details the appropriations power of the U.S.
Congress.27 Clause VII states,
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money
shall be published from time to time.”28
The process starts with the proposal of the President’s budget. This is followed by a budget
resolution process undertaken by Congress and subsequent legislation of an approved budget for
the next fiscal year.29 In recent years this process has been subject to increased partisanship
U.S. Census Bureau, “Median Household Income by State,” Historical Income Tables: Household, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-households.html
26
Figure 3
27
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9
28
Ibid.
29
The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, D.C., 2016.
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which has limited the ability of Congressional representatives to coordinate, bargain, and make
deals with one another to reach policy decisions. This consistent practice of bargaining federal
funds within Congress led to the implementation of the earmark moratorium and stemmed from
the campaign to reduce political corruption in the appropriations process. Earmarks and funding
initiatives are utilized as political currency to trade special projects and funding opportunities for
co-sponsorships, legislative support, and encouraged bi-partisan legislation.30 This model will
determine if a significant effect has occurred regarding the reformed prohibition of bargaining
federal funds or trading earmarks to foster bi-partisanship.
Regarding these bargaining tactics, the inclusion of political variables and characteristics
will be a critical set of explanatory variables. Regarding the influence and agenda setting power
of the U.S. Congress, Senate party affiliations, majorities, seniority, and committee assignments
and chairmanships each have the potential to influence which U.S. Senators receive appropriated
funding in their states. When political parties hold the majority on Capitol Hill, they wield the
power to set legislative agendas. Regardless of party affiliation, the tenure of a U.S. Senator
contributes a major factor in their ability to foster influence. Tenured Senators gain status due to
their increased political rank and influence that accompany multiple years in the Capitol. Those
with longer service find themselves in party leadership, coveted committee assignments, and
positions of power and persuasion. With tenure and status come committee and sub-committee
assignments by party leadership. Chairmanships on these committees are coveted due to their
ability to set agendas for specific sectors of U.S. policy. All legislative priorities are subject to
committee determinations before ever coming up for a Senate floor vote. Although these factors
are all significant, the ability of a Senator to compromise, barter, and deal provides the ability to

Hedlund, Aaron. “Pork-Barrel Politics and Polarization.” Review – Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Volume 101, Issue No. 1, (2019): 57 –
68. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.uky.edu/docview/2171586287/fulltextPDF/571283D2BDEB4E47PQ/1?accountid=11836
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pass pieces of legislation through the Senate and into law. Political prowess and competency are
paramount to the ability of a Senator to introduce legislation and get it passed in the Senate.
Below is a summary table of the political characteristic measures included in this model. Many
of the variables provided below are individual categorical characteristics. Each of the means
demonstrate the variation of the data for each categorical variable.
CATEGORICAL VARIABLES31

31

Descriptive Statistics: Political Characteristics

Years: 2002 – 2018

Observations

Frequency

Percentage

Two Republicans
Bi – Partisan Delegation
Two Democrats
Three Democrats
Four Democrats

400
400
400
400
400

142
119
131
7
1

35.50
29.75
32.75
1.75
0.25

Zero in the Majority
One in the Majority
Two in the Majority
Three in the Majority
Four in the Majority

400
400
400
400
400

126
117
149
7
1

31.50
29.25
37.25
1.75
0.25

Zero Committee Chairs
One Committee Chair
Two Committee Chairs

400
400
400

283
94
23

70.75
23.50
5.75

Zero Sub-Committee Chairs
One Sub-Committee Chair
Two Sub-Committee Chairs

400
400
400

153
153
94

38.25
38.25
23.50

No Majority Leader
One Majority Leader

400
400

353
47

88.25
11.75

No Minority Leader
One Minority Leader
Two Minority Leaders

400
400
400

351
48
1

87.25
12.00
0.25

Zero on Power Committee
One on Power Committee
Two on Power Committee
Three on Power Committee

400
400
400
400

15
151
231
3

3.75
37.75
57.75
0.75

Figure 4
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Descriptive Statistics: Political Characteristics

Years: 2002 – 2018

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Seniority
Total Bills Through the Senate
Total Bills Through to Law

400
400
400

13.11
4.637
2.312

7.533
4.195
2.226

2
0
0

40
24
14

The selection of specific political elements aim to control for these variables in the
distribution of federal funding awards. This study will analyze U.S. Senate political party
affiliations, party majorities and minorities, party leadership, effectiveness to pass legislation and
become law, committee and subcommittee chairmanships, power committee assignments, and
seniority.33 Each of these political variables are determined to be potentially influential in the
earmarking process as noted in the review of literature. A Senator’s ability to harness these
characteristics and utilize them to create law are principal in influencing the appropriations and
funding allocation process.
Description of each variable propositioned for this analysis is critical to building a
successful model. Each independent variable described will be organized by state and fiscal year
from 2002 to 2018 and merged into one data set. A single data model will be constructed to
observe the dependent variable and explanatory control variables. Further description of the
research design will establish the construct of a regression model that will determine the
significant effects of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable, federal appropriations.
Research Design
With the parameters set, the hypotheses stated, and the variables defined, this section will
analyze the design of the regression model to determine the effect of Senatorial political

32
33

Figure 5
Craig Volden Alan E. Wiseman. Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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characteristics and the implementation of the moratorium and earmark reforms. Detailed
reasoning for each explanatory variable’s inclusion in this model represents a diverse and broad
spectrum of controls. To accurately determine a statistically significant effect, each variable will
be analyzed utilizing a time series fixed effects regression. To build this model, state and year are
set as panel variables, state as the entities or panels and year as the time variable. This analysis
will be observing federal appropriations, state economic factors, and U.S. Senate delegation
political characteristics across time at the state level utilizing cross-sectional analysis
implemented by a panel data model. This model will account for unobservable controls that vary
over time but not across entities. These would include unmeasurable political characteristics and
other national controls that affect states and the receipt of federal appropriations. Regarding the
use of fixed effects, a Hausman Test was executed to determine the validity of this proposed
model and determine if a control for endogeneity is required for this analysis. The Hausman Test
runs an estimation method for both fixed and random effects. The null states that both estimation
methods demonstrate similar coefficients. The rejection of the null demonstrates that differences
occur between both sets of coefficients, where random effects reveal inconsistencies. When
running the Hausman Test on this model, the results demonstrated a rejection of the null.
Therefore, the use of fixed effects with state and year can appropriately be structured into a panel
data model.
To further demonstrate support for the use of fixed effects, this method is used when
analyzing the impact of variables that vary over time. Fixed effects accounts for the relationships
between the explanatory and dependent variables within an entity. This model includes states as
the entity of analysis, which each may have its own individual characteristics that could
influence the political personalities of each U.S. Senator and the allocation of federal
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appropriations. These include the state and local variables that affect how Senators are elected
and how they vote in Washington. With fixed effects, this model assumes that unobserved
variables within the state may impact the explanatory or dependent variables. Therefore, this
model controls for the potential omitted variable bias of political characteristics that have timeinvariant values with time-invariant effects. Fixed effects accounts for variability within the
states and omitted variable bias to accurately evaluate the net effect that the Senate delegation
political characteristics have on federal appropriations to the states.
With the inclusion of the explanatory variables, dependent variable, and time series fixed
effects regression model, the equation of this study is demonstrated below:

cfit = αit + 1x1 … 1n1 + ρ.it
The variable cfit represents the equation’s dependent variable total federal funding awards
allocated by legislative appropriations in the U.S. Congress.

αit denotes that if there were no

additional variables or controls on the right side of the equation, the result of the equation would
be zero. 1x1 … 1n1 is the set of economic and political explanatory variables detailed and
specifically determined to demonstrate a potential effect on the dependent variable. ρ.it expresses
the error terms or unobserved variables. The i in this equation represents the state and t
represents the fiscal year observed. The it variables specify the unit of analysis in this equation.
This model will utilize a social science standard two-tail t test with a 95% confidence interval to
determine the significance of results.
When constructing this regression model, total federal funding awards are aggregated by
state from a sum of total appropriated prime assistance and contracts.34 In addition, the economic

Award Data Archive, prepared by the U.S. Department of Treasury (Washington, D.C., 2019).
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variables are outlined and listed by state and year. The political variables are the primary
explanatory variable of analysis. These are listed out as multiple variables but all are
characteristics of Senators and their political status. When observing Senators’ ability to attract
federal funding awards to states via political influence, this model treats each Senator as a
treatment on the individual state. The Senate data is categorized by each Congress, therefore
accounting for the even years within this model. However, there are two Senators per state,
demonstrating that each state receives two instances of the treatment each Congress. When
observing the Senators as individual treatments, we can aggregate each treatment in an individual
state and year to measure the full effect of that state’s Senatorial delegation’s political influence
on the annual appropriations process. Therefore, this model collapses the Senate data into
Senatorial delegations by state. The individual identity of each Senator is irrelevant to this study
but each state’s combined Senatorial delegation’s ability to attract federal funding awards is
critical to this model. There are abnormal circumstances when states have three, or in the case of
Massachusetts in 2012, four Senators present. There are sixteen instances of three Senators from
an individual state during one Congress in the available data. These instances do occur but their
significance is minimal to the overall model due to the disruption of a sitting Senator’s term and
the blunted impact a broken term has on influence and effectiveness.
With the data organized for this model, each of the specific explanatory variables and the
dependent variable are merged into a single data set. Many of the political characteristics are
listed in the data set as categories and the regression is executed with fixed effects and a
robustness check to account for the assumptions made in the model. With the aggregation of the
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A www.usaspending.gov_-23_download-5Fcenter_award5Fdata5Farchive&d=DwMFg&c=L93KkjKsAC98uTvC4KvQDdTDRzAeWDDRmG6S3YXllH0&r=zG4OKSHOL9AqZiSFq_FCJU1cQ7MXqy
qxzXysXVq4dmY&m=7h22aA8CoBiI0uNBqppBcGqeG50BQZxmoWdLcQQg0rs&s=TmOY6VDAyu4d7o4PpuvbHZsQDZ0mSNoCwEvPfyte
oT8&e
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Senatorial delegation characteristics, merging the economic variables, and executing the
regression on the dependent variable of Congressionally directed federal spending, the results
will reveal the null or rejection of the null hypotheses.
Results

35
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Figure 6
Figure 7
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Following the execution of this regression model, specific explanatory variables resulted in
correlations of statistical significance. The most significant economic factor resulting from this
model was state median income. Utilizing the 95% confidence interval, median income resulted
in statistical significance. The coefficient stated that for every dollar added to the state’s median
income, $1,535,916.00 were brought into the individual state. The next economic factor with
significance was the impact of each state’s labor market. Labor force participation had a
coefficient that stated for every person included in the labor force, $33,477.20 was allocated to
the state from the federal government. State population also resulted in a significant correlation.
The coefficient stated for every person added into the population count, $27,321.09 was
distributed to the state. These findings individually demonstrate a relationship with federal
funding allocation best defined by the Congressional Research Service as, “through a statutory or
administrative formula or competitive award process.”38 Congress and the Executive agencies
calculate these broad economic factors into legislation and Executive agency formulas to
37
38

Figure 8
Lifting the Earmark Moratorium: Frequently Asked Questions, prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Washington, D.C., 2018.
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distribute funding to states. This is true for grant applications, direct allocations, and contract
bids to specific state governments, local entities, private businesses, and individuals.
Each economic factor included in this model demonstrated statistical significance in the
federal appropriations process. However, there was no such uniformity when it came to the
Senatorial political characteristic variables. A majority of these factors demonstrated no
significant effects however, three specific variables did. Each Senate delegation was analyzed in
this model for their combined effect as two combined treatments on each state. With one Senator
from a state in the Majority party, this characteristic resulted in a significant effect. Although this
finding demonstrated significance, the coefficient stated that this majority advantage would
decrease funding allocation to a state by $12.3 billion. The results are similar when observing the
effects of Senators and their ability to pass a piece of legislation through Congress and into law.
This characteristic resulted in a significant effect however, the coefficient stated that this ability
would decrease funding allocation to a state by $1.65 billion. The characteristic with the greatest
significance was party affiliation. When observing states with two Democrats or two
Republicans, these held no statistically significant effects on the allocation of federal funding.
However, when a state had one Democrat and one Republican, or held a bi-partisan delegation,
this was a significant result. A bi-partisan state delegation resulted in a coefficient of increased
federal funding by $20.3 billion. Below is a table of this model’s regression results.
Federal Appropriations: Economic and Political Effects39
Federal
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Appropriations
Sum of Democrat Senators (1)
Sum of Democrat Senators (2)

2.027e+10***
(5.757e+09)
7.400e+09
(5.539e+09)

CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS AND EARMARKS
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Sum of Majority Party (1)
Sum of Majority Party (2)
Sum of Committee Chair (1)
Sum of Committee Chair (2)
Sum of Sub-Committee Chair (1)
Sum of Sub-Committee Chair (2)
Sum of Seniority
Sum of Majority Leader
Sum of Minority Leader (1)
Sum of Minority Leader (2)
Sum of Totals Bills Through the Senate
Sum of Total Bills Through to Law
Sum of Power Committee (1)
Sum of Power Committee (2)
Median Income
Population
Labor Force Participation
Constant

30
Federal
Appropriations
-1.233e+10**
(6.104e+09)
-7.825e+09
(5.611e+09)
4.535e+09
(4.708e+09)
5.969e+08
(6.532e+09)
8.934e+09
(6.321e+09)
7.822e+09
(6.441e+09)
-2.823e+08
(3.375e+08)
-2.779e+09
(4.598e+09)
-2.632e+09
(3.538e+09)
7.719e+09
(2.369e+10)
4.480e+08
(5.625e+08)
-1.651e+09**
(7.818e+08)
3.452e+08
(5.110e+09)
1.046e+09
(5.522e+09)
1.536e+06***
(387,379)
27,321**
(12,398)
33,477***
(12,387)
-3.136e+11***
(7.780e+10)

Observations
Number of States
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

39

Figure 9

400
50
0.612
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Each of the other political characteristics did not establish statistically significant results
in this model. Those included committee and sub-committee chairmanships, minority or majority
party leadership, total bills passed through the Senate, power committee membership, or
seniority in the Senate. From these reported results, select Senate delegation political
characteristics can demonstrate a statistically significant effect on the federal funding
appropriations process. Therefore, the earmark moratorium and reforms did not curb all of the
effects of Congressional political characteristics. The broad economic factors demonstrate a
significant effect on the funding distribution. This can be best explained by the competitive,
formula driven award process that utilizes these statistics. The interpretation of these findings
and relevancy to the hypotheses of this study will be detailed in the next section.
Discussion
When observing the overall results of this model, the economic factors play a significant
role in the Congressional appropriations process. The federal agency application method remains
an established procedure for federal funding solicitations and serves as the primary vehicle of
allocation. The model’s results combined with the context of an increasing trend in the number
of federal grants to states and local governments has strongly supported that broad economic
factors are important to what states receive from Congress and the Executive agencies each fiscal
year.40 These findings lend support to the importance of individuals and states to report accurate
population, labor force participation, and median income figures to the federal agencies.
Therefore, it can be logically concluded that participation in the census and state agency specific
data are important to determine state specific allocation.

Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues, prepared by the Congressional Research
Service. Washington, D.C., 2019.
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As each broad economic factor contributes a significant effect in the federal allocation
process, the analysis of the political characteristics each provide differing results. Referencing
the analysis of the literature, the focus on reducing and controlling the effects of political
characteristics were paramount in the gradual evolution of the earmark moratorium. The period
covered in this model accounted for years prior to, during, and following the moratorium’s
inception, debate, and adoption. This assessment accounts for the overall effects of Senate
delegation political characteristics during this period. In the execution of this model, many of the
political characteristics had no significant effect.
Committee and sub-committee chairmanships did not demonstrate a significant effect.
This result could be due to the role of committees and their leadership focus. Committees are
issue specific and serve as the primary authority on the inception of specific legislative agendas.
Each Senator is assigned to individual committees to oversee these issues not only for their
states, but more importantly on a national level. When a Senator serves as chairperson of a
committee, a significant portion of their time and work are focused on the issues and agendas of
that committee. This can serve as a hindrance to attracting federal funding to their specific state.
The results of these factors demonstrate that committee and sub-committee work can attract
attention and work from the allocation process. In addition to committee and sub-committee
chairmanships, assignment to a “power committee” also resulted in no significant effect. Both
political parties in the Senate consider Appropriations, Armed Services, and Finance committees
to be “Super A” or power committees.41 Although the Appropriations committee is significant to
the allocation process on the national level, it is not significant in the distribution to a specific
committee member’s state. The proposed conclusions of this result are similar to the assignment

41
Senate Committees, prepared by the U.S. Senate. Washington, D.C., 2019.
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm
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of a committee or sub-committee chairmanship. Leadership on a committee and a seat with a
power committee demonstrate Senators can focus their work on specific assignments over the
ability to draw funding to their state.
A similar argument can be presented for majority and minority party leadership in the
Senate. The leadership team of each political party focuses on the agendas of the party
delegation. This includes whipping party votes, setting agendas, and towing the party line. With
this focus in mind, the ability of a leader to prioritize funding allocation to their specific state can
be left to a lower importance. Committee chairmanships and party leadership can be correlated
with seniority. In this model, the tenure of a Senator does not demonstrate a significant effect on
funding allocation. The potential reasons for this lack of significant correlation can stem from a
senior Senator’s focus on gaining influence through leadership or committee assignments. These
goals lead to greater influence on funding and legislative priorities overall but have no significant
effect in attracting funding appropriations to their representative state.
The final political factor that had no significant effect on funding distribution in this
model was the ability of a Senator to pass a piece of legislation through the Senate. Although this
result demonstrates no significance, it can be linked with the ability of a Senator to pass a piece
legislation into law. This political characteristic demonstrated a significant effect on federal
funding but with a negative coefficient of $1.65 billion to the Senator’s state. Therefore, the
ability to get a piece of legislation through both chambers and to the President for signature is
significant, but can lead to less federal funding allocation. This result can provide implications of
a Senator’s ability and focus on getting legislation passed into law but will regress attention to
advocating for additional federal funding. In addition, Senators pushing to pass specific
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legislation will need cooperation and compromise for passage. This could lead to comprising
funding in exchange for specific agendas.
This political exchange and cooperation can be a significant reason for the negative
coefficient found with a Senator in the majority party. The general assumption is that majority
parties hold the agenda setting power in the Senate. Although there is truth to this statement
regarding legislative agendas, minority parties can wield a significant amount of influence as
well. This result can be traced back to the founding and the structures of the Republic, giving
minority parties in power the ability influence the majority, especially when the margin of
difference is minimal. No party has held a super majority in the Senate during the period of
analysis. Therefore, majority parties must give in to concessions of the minority to pass
legislation, set agreements on agendas, and allocate federal spending. This is supported by the
finding that a Senator’s involvement with the majority party produces a negative coefficient of
$12.3 billion per state. Although the significance is less robust than the other political
characteristics, there remains a significant effect with majority party affiliation.
While there is significant evidence that compromise can result in a decrease in federal
funding for members of the majority party, working with the opposite political party can
demonstrate a positive outcome. The sole political characteristic that demonstrated a statistically
significant result with a positive coefficient of $20.3 billion was the presence of a Republican
and Democratic Senator from one state. A bi-partisan delegation resulted in the ability of that
state to secure $20.3 billion more than states with single party delegations.
The implications of a state bi-partisan delegation demonstrate that bi-partisan
relationships coupled with representation lead to increased amounts of federal funding. When
majority and minority parties trade, concede, and compromise on legislation for passage, these
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actions lead to defeats and victories on each side of the aisle. The party coalitions must work
together to achieve the legislative priorities each are working to gain. Thus, when political
factions trade and compromise, each side gets specific requests met. When these instances of bipartisan deal making occur, states can receive additional federal allocations of $20.3 billion with
the presence of a Republican and Democrat Senator but also decrease appropriations by $12.3
billion on average with a split majority and minority party Senate delegation. If the mean of
federal spending to the states each year totals $39 billion, the ability to acquire $20.3 billion or
lose $12.3 billion on average for a specific state based upon the political savvy and deal making
abilities of Senators are paramount characteristics when serving in Washington. Of the political
characteristics utilized as explanatory variables in this model, the bi-partisan Senatorial state
delegation demonstrates the most significant effect in securing federal funding to a state.
From the description and interpretation of these results, federal appropriations remain
influenced significantly by bi-partisan deal making and legislative trading. Thus, this model fails
to reject the null hypothesis and demonstrates that although the earmark moratorium and reforms
have been formally banned, the presence of politically motivated appropriations continue to
persist. Although there is a growing sense of political polarization in Washington, this trend
clearly does not affect the ability of opposing party Senators to collaborate, secure legislative
agendas, and barter federal appropriations. With the political characteristics proven to be
significant, bargains and compromises remain relevant in the legislative processes on Capitol
Hill. Therefore, the presence of the earmark reforms and moratorium over the period of analysis
failed to eliminate the utilization of politically motivated spending in Congress.
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Limitations
Although this model reveals significant results in the allocation of federal funding since
2002, this model has its limitations. This study observed federal funding data from 2002 – 2018
and accounted for these years as time variables and states as panel variables in the time series
fixed effects regression model. However, the effect of the earmarking reforms and moratorium
by year were not assessed as an explanatory variable in the outcome of the model. By observing
total federal funding data by year, there is the assumption that the earmark moratorium of 2011
potentially helped with lowering appropriations temporarily. However, this assumption does not
correlate with the reform actions by Congress and the Bush Administration starting in 2006. The
exclusion of year as an explanatory variable was predominately due to the exponential increase
in federal funding that occurred in response to the Great Recession between 2006 – 2008.
Federal funding increased in some states by a factor of four or five times the previous year’s
allocation. This was a significant increase in funding and the escalation continued gradually
following the recession. By observing this trend, skewedness was tested and the data was
adjusted accordingly to set year as a time variable in this model. Therefore, year as an
explanatory outcome variable skewed the effect total appropriations had on the regression.
Additional limitations narrowed this study to a Senate delegation by state analysis due to
limited and fluid data in the U.S. House, the collapse of the Senate political characteristics, and
available Senate data by Congress, not each individual year. When observing the economic
effects, this study observed broad measures that apply to each state in the Union. Population,
median income, and labor force participation data accounted for per capita data measures that
would observe appropriations to states of differing demographics. However, each of the states
have numerous controls not accounted for in this model. Although fixed effects accounted for
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within subject variability of the states, further analysis can observe the variability across states.
Additional variables were considered for inclusion in this study such as political media presence
and social media usage. However, these proposed variables were excluded due to the difficulty to
gather and utilize measurable data.
Conclusions
When observing the overall effects of this model, the economic variables were each
statistically significant and provided evidence that reporting accurate state population, labor
force, and median income data is crucial to maximizing federal assistance proportionate to the
citizenry of an individual state. These findings conclude that states with greater population and
wealth also receive the greatest allocation of federal funding.
The earmark reforms and moratorium instituted by Congress aimed to decrease the
amount of federal spending affected by political characteristics. By accounting for the
explanatory variables across the period analyzed, this model aimed to observe their total effects
on states by year. Following observation of the results, they reveal the ability of U.S. Senators to
influence the appropriations process utilizing political status to trade and negotiate on behalf of
their state. Although the majority of the political characteristics included in this model did not
result in significant effects on the appropriation of federal funding, three demonstrated such an
effect. The Senatorial explanatory variables of significance provided evidence that majority party
rule, the ability of a Senator to pass a bill into law, and the presence of one Senator from each
party demonstrates a significant effect on federal appropriations. This conclusion validates that
although earmarking reforms and moratoriums remain formally established through chamber
rules and protocols, political characteristics remain influential in the appropriations process over
the period analyzed. With the ability to utilize political capital, Senators maintain the power to
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utilize the significant characteristics controlled in this model to influence allocation of federal
appropriations. This ability relies greatly on the political party structure and utilizes party
position as an advantage in this process. Therefore, this model failed to reject the null hypothesis
and demonstrated that the earmark moratorium and reforms did not determine a significant effect
in the distribution of federal funding awards at the state level independent of the U.S. Senator
serving in Congress.
The results of this model can be utilized to assess and review the current policies and
reforms under debate in Congress. With these rules in place, Congress has continued to increase
spending and wield political savvy as determinants of federal appropriations. Although earmarks
are formally banned, members of Congress have established alternative avenues to wield
political status. I recommend Congress utilize this study to initiate debate on the effectiveness of
the earmark reforms and moratorium. In addition, further evaluation of this study can provide the
basis for measuring and tracking the effectiveness of political characteristics in the
appropriations process. With an overview of the general political characteristics observed,
further detailed analysis will yield greater understanding of political effects on policy initiatives
in Washington.
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